Abstract
Pain is a form of sensation, but the one sensation that cannot be read off a stimulus. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines it as an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage — a definition written precisely to sever the equation of pain with injury. This article treats pain as the central worked problem of perception: how tissue-threatening events become nociceptive signals, how those signals are gated in the spinal cord and shaped by descending control, how a private experience with no external gauge is measured through psychophysics, and how attention, expectation, catastrophizing, and central sensitization decouple felt pain from bodily damage. That decoupling is not a defect but its defining feature, and it is why pain is studied by psychology as much as physiology.
Keywords: pain, nociception, gate control theory, central sensitization, pain catastrophizing
Pain is the most insistent of the senses and the least obedient to its stimulus. A soldier can be gravely wounded and feel little, while a person with a healed injury can be crippled by pain that has outlived its cause. In the Medical Subject Headings classification pain is filed under sensation, among the ways the nervous system registers the state of the body, and it is subdivided into dozens of narrower headings by site, time course, and mechanism. But the placement under sensation is only half the story, because pain is also an emotion and a motivation: it is built to feel bad, to capture attention, and to compel action, and any account that treats it as a pure sensory channel misses what makes it pain (Raja et al., 2020). This article follows pain from the periphery to the brain and back, using the gate that Melzack and Wall proposed sixty years ago as the organizing idea (Melzack & Wall, 1965).
- Pain is defined by experience, not by tissue damage: it is an unpleasant sensory and emotional state that can occur with or without injury.
- Nociception, the peripheral signaling of tissue threat, is necessary for most pain but is not itself pain; the two can dissociate in both directions.
- Gate control theory places a modulating gate in the spinal dorsal horn, opened by nociceptive input and closed by touch input and by descending control from the brain.
- Because pain is private, it is measured psychophysically, with intensity scales and multidimensional questionnaires rather than any external instrument.
- Attention, expectation, catastrophizing, fear-avoidance, and central sensitization amplify or dampen pain and drive the transition from acute to chronic pain.
What Pain Is
Pain is defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain as an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage. The revision of that definition was deliberate on several points: it removed any requirement that damage actually be present, it added the phrase resembling that associated with to cover pain that mimics injury with no injury behind it, and it kept the word emotional in the core of the definition rather than treating feeling as a reaction to a sensory fact (Raja et al., 2020). Pain, on this account, is a perceptual and motivational state produced by the nervous system, not a signal piped unchanged from the site of harm.
The distinction that makes the rest of pain science possible is between nociception and pain. Nociception is the neural encoding of noxious stimuli: high-threshold sensory endings called nociceptors transduce tissue-threatening mechanical, thermal, and chemical events into trains of nerve impulses (Basbaum et al., 2009). Nociception is the input; pain is the experience the brain may or may not construct from it. The two dissociate in both directions, which is the strongest evidence that they are not the same thing. Nociception without pain occurs in stress-induced analgesia, where a severe wound goes unfelt in the moment of emergency; pain without nociception occurs in phantom limb pain and in many chronic pain states, where the felt pain has no ongoing peripheral driver at all. Melzack's later work took this dissociation to its conclusion, proposing that pain is generated by a widely distributed body-self neuromatrix in the brain, so that peripheral input modulates a pain-producing network rather than delivering pain ready-made (Melzack, 1999).
Figure 1
Nociception, the Spinal Gate, and the Brain
The Spinal Gate
Gate control theory made quantitative. Nociceptive drive is not sent straight to the brain: large touch fibers and descending control from the brain close the gate, while a sensitized central system multiplies the drive before the gate can act. Perceived pain P = g·N − 0.5·T − D, clamped to 0–10.
Illustrative model: P = g·N − 0.5·T − D, clamped to 0–10. The worked example: N = 8 ungated gives 8; adding T = 6, D = 3 gives 2 (a 75% reduction); sensitizing to g = 1.5 with the same gating gives 6. Directional, not a data fit. Computed locally, not stored.
Types of Pain
In the MeSH classification pain is a broad heading with many narrower descriptors beneath it, filed under the parent heading of sensation. These subtypes carve pain along several different axes at once — by body region, by time course, by mechanism, and by clinical setting — so they are not a single clean taxonomy and are not mutually exclusive. MeSH is an indexing vocabulary built to file the clinical literature, not a theory of how pain divides at its natural joints: a patient can carry several of these labels at once, and a given pain can be simultaneously, for instance, chronic, musculoskeletal, and nociplastic. With that caveat, the direct MeSH subtypes of pain are the following, with live articles linked.
| Subtype | In brief |
|---|---|
| Abdominal Pain | Pain in the abdomen, arising from the visceral organs or the somatic structures of the abdominal wall. |
| Acute Pain | Pain of recent onset and limited duration, usually with an identifiable nociceptive cause; the adaptive alarm that signals actual or potential tissue damage. |
| Arthralgia | Pain localized to a joint, most often from osteoarthritis, where the state of the joint predicts reported pain only weakly. |
| Back Pain | Pain in the back, among the leading causes of disability worldwide and often chronic. |
| Breakthrough Pain | A transient flare of severe pain that breaks through otherwise controlled background pain. |
| Cancer Pain | Pain caused by a tumour or its treatment, frequently a mix of nociceptive and neuropathic mechanisms. |
| Chest Pain | Pain felt in the chest, a symptom whose interpretation is dominated by the need to exclude cardiac causes. |
| Chronic Pain | Pain that persists or recurs beyond normal healing, formalized in ICD-11 as a condition in its own right rather than merely a symptom (Treede et al., 2019). |
| Earache | Pain felt in the ear, from local disease of the ear or referred from structures sharing its innervation. |
| Eye Pain | Pain felt in or around the eye, a densely innervated organ where even minor surface injury is intensely painful. |
| Facial Pain | Pain in the face, spanning the trigeminal neuralgias and temporomandibular disorders. |
| Flank Pain | Pain in the flank, classically arising from the kidney and upper urinary tract. |
| Glossalgia | Pain or burning in the tongue, often with no visible cause, as in burning mouth syndrome. |
| Headache | Pain in the head, the most common of all pain complaints and itself divided into many distinct disorders. |
| Intractable Pain | Severe pain that resists the usual means of control. |
| Labor Pain | The pain of uterine contraction and cervical dilation during childbirth. |
| Mastodynia | Pain in the breast, frequently cyclical with the menstrual cycle. |
| Metatarsalgia | Pain in the forefoot at the metatarsal heads, a worked example of load-related nociception. |
| Musculoskeletal Pain | Pain arising from muscles, bones, joints, tendons, and ligaments, the commonest source of chronic pain worldwide. |
| Neck Pain | Pain in the cervical region, frequently musculoskeletal and often chronic. |
| Neuralgia | Pain caused by a lesion or disease of the somatosensory nervous system itself, felt in the territory of the affected nerve. |
| Nociceptive Pain | Pain arising from actual or threatened damage to non-neural tissue and driven by the activation of nociceptors, the prototypical case the pathway of Figure 1 describes. |
| Nociplastic Pain | Pain arising from altered nociception without clear evidence of tissue damage or of a lesion of the somatosensory system; the mechanism behind conditions such as fibromyalgia (Fitzcharles et al., 2021). |
| Pain Threshold | The least intensity at which a stimulus is perceived as painful, the psychophysical boundary of pain. |
| Pelvic Pain | Pain in the pelvis, from gynaecological, urological, or gastrointestinal sources, often chronic and multifactorial. |
| Postoperative Pain | Acute pain following surgery, whose control shapes recovery and the risk of chronic post-surgical pain. |
| Procedural Pain | Pain caused by a medical procedure, a particular concern in the care of infants and children. |
| Referred Pain | Pain felt at a site distant from its source, arising from the convergence of visceral and somatic afferents. |
| Renal Colic | Severe, wave-like flank pain from obstruction of the urinary tract, a classic instance of visceral and referred pain. |
Table 1. Direct subtypes of pain in the MeSH classification (descriptor D010146, tree F02.830.816.444 and C23.888.592.612). Only subtypes with a live article are linked.
The axes cut across one another, and the two that matter most for psychology are time course and mechanism. The acute–chronic distinction is not merely one of duration: acute pain is the adaptive alarm that protects a healing tissue, whereas chronic pain frequently persists after healing and is better understood as a disease of the pain system itself. The mechanistic triad — nociceptive, neuropathic, and nociplastic pain — sorts pain by where in the system the trouble lies: in the tissue, in the nerve, or in the central processing of nociception with no clear tissue or nerve lesion at all (Fitzcharles et al., 2021).
Nociception and the Spinal Gate
The peripheral event in most pain is nociception. Nociceptors are the free nerve endings of thin sensory fibers that respond only to stimuli intense enough to threaten tissue, transducing noxious heat, extreme pressure, and the chemical soup of inflammation into nerve impulses (Basbaum et al., 2009). Their signals travel toward the dorsal horn of the spinal cord along two kinds of fiber: fast, thinly myelinated Aδ fibers that carry the sharp first pain of an injury, and slow, unmyelinated C fibers that carry the dull, aching second pain that follows. But nociception is not yet pain, and what happens at the dorsal horn is where the single most influential idea in modern pain science intervenes.
Gate control theory proposed that the transmission of nociceptive signals from the spinal cord to the brain is regulated by a gating mechanism in the dorsal horn. Activity in the large-diameter Aβ fibers that carry touch tends to close the gate and reduce transmission, activity in the small nociceptive fibers tends to open it, and — the theory's most consequential claim — descending signals from the brain can bias the gate in either direction (Melzack & Wall, 1965). The theory explained everyday facts a simple wire-from-injury-to-brain model could not: why rubbing a banged shin genuinely eases it, because touch input closes the gate; why the same wound hurts more at night or when feared, because descending control has swung the other way. The descending pathways are now well characterized, running from the brainstem to the dorsal horn and capable of both inhibiting and facilitating pain, and they are the substrate through which attention, mood, and expectation reach into the spinal cord (Fields, 2004).
The modern refinement of the central side is central sensitization: sustained nociceptive input can increase the responsiveness of the dorsal horn neurons themselves, so that they amplify subsequent input and even respond to normally innocuous signals (Woolf, 2011). A sensitized system produces allodynia, pain from a stimulus that is not normally painful, and hyperalgesia, an exaggerated response to one that is. Central sensitization is the mechanism that lets pain outlast its cause, and it is the bridge between the acute alarm and the chronic disease.
Central Sensitization and the Pressure-Pain Threshold
Quantitative sensory testing measures the pressure at which touch first becomes painful — the pressure-pain threshold. Sustained input lowers it locally; central sensitization lowers it even at a distant, healthy site, the signature that the pain system itself has been turned up.
Illustrative model: local PPT = 400 − 22·drive − 30·sensitization; remote PPT = 500 − 40·sensitization, each floored. Falling thresholds at a remote site index central sensitization. Computed locally, not stored.
Measuring Pain
Because pain is private, it cannot be read off an instrument the way temperature or blood pressure can; it must be measured through report, and the psychophysics of that measurement is a field in its own right. The simplest tools are unidimensional intensity scales: the visual analogue scale, on which a person marks pain on a line from no pain to worst imaginable pain, and the numeric rating scale from zero to ten. These are quick, sensitive to change, and well validated, and they are the workhorses of clinic and trial alike. But a single number discards almost everything about the experience — the burning of a nerve injury and the cramping of a colic might both be rated a seven — and it is silent about the emotional dimension the definition of pain insists on.
The McGill Pain Questionnaire was built to recover that lost structure. It asks patients to choose from sets of verbal descriptors grouped into sensory, affective, and evaluative dimensions — is the pain throbbing, gnawing, burning, aching; is it tiring, sickening, fearful; is it annoying or unbearable — and so treats pain quality as multidimensional rather than as a single magnitude. The move matters conceptually because it embeds, in a measurement tool, the claim that pain has an emotional component built in rather than added afterward; the affective dimension is not noise around a true sensory value but part of what pain is (Raja et al., 2020). Standardized psychophysical methods extend this to the laboratory: quantitative sensory testing measures thresholds such as the pressure-pain threshold and can detect the lowered thresholds and spreading tenderness that mark a sensitized central pain system. For tracking a pain over time, the temporal classification into acute pain as a symptom and chronic pain as a condition in its own right is now formalized in the international disease classification (Treede et al., 2019).
One Number vs Many
A visual analogue scale reports a single intensity; the McGill Pain Questionnaire treats pain as sensory, affective, and evaluative at once. Move the three dimensions and watch how much a single number throws away.
McGill composite index: 47 / 100 across three dimensions.
Illustrative: the VAS shown tracks the sensory dimension; the McGill index is the mean of all three, scaled to 100. The point is structural — a single number cannot separate a burning seven from an aching seven. Computed locally, not stored.
The Psychology of Chronic Pain
Much pain is acute and resolves with its cause, but a substantial fraction becomes chronic and disabling out of proportion to any peripheral driver, and here psychological processes move from modulators to prime movers. The first is attention. Pain is evolutionarily built to interrupt: it captures attention, disrupts concentration, and demands a response, and this interruptive function is a cognitive-affective mechanism that can be measured and, in part, opposed by competing attentional demands. Distraction genuinely reduces pain and anxious over-monitoring genuinely increases it, both acting through the descending control that gate control theory anticipated and that neuroimaging localizes to identifiable brain systems for the cognitive and emotional control of pain (Bushnell et al., 2013).
The second is expectation. What a person believes will happen to their pain shapes what they feel, and the placebo response is the clearest demonstration: an inert treatment believed to be an analgesic reliably reduces pain through the same descending opioid systems that endogenous pain control uses, connecting context, learning, and health in a way that is now traceable in the brain (Wager & Atlas, 2015). The third is pain catastrophizing, an exaggerated negative orientation toward pain comprising rumination, magnification, and helplessness; measured with the Pain Catastrophizing Scale, it is one of the most robust psychological predictors of who will develop chronic pain and disability from an initially minor complaint (Sullivan et al., 1995). Closely linked is the fear-avoidance model: a person who interprets pain as a sign of ongoing damage becomes fearful of the movements that provoke it, avoids them, and through disuse, deconditioning, and hypervigilance enters a self-perpetuating cycle in which the fear of pain becomes more disabling than the pain itself (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). This is why the modern management of chronic pain is biopsychosocial rather than purely structural, pairing any needed treatment of the tissue with graded activity, education, and the targeting of catastrophic beliefs, because addressing the periphery alone leaves the central amplifiers untouched (Cohen et al., 2021).
Worked Example
The gate can be made quantitative, and doing so shows how the same nociceptive drive can be felt as agony or as a twinge. Model perceived pain on a zero-to-ten scale as the nociceptive drive minus what the gate subtracts: P = clamp(g × N − 0.5 × T − D, 0, 10), where N is the nociceptive input, T is the competing touch input that closes the gate, D is the descending inhibition, and g is a sensitization gain that is 1 in a normal system. The weights are illustrative, chosen to make the arithmetic transparent rather than to fit data. Take a strong nociceptive drive, N = 8. With no gating — no touch counter-stimulation and no descending inhibition, T = 0 and D = 0 — the perceived pain is P = 8, near the top of the scale. Now rub the area and engage descending control, T = 6 and D = 3: the gate subtracts 0.5 × 6 = 3 from touch and a further 3 from descending inhibition, so P = 8 − 3 − 3 = 2. The identical peripheral injury is now felt at a quarter of its ungated intensity, a 75% reduction, purely through gating. Finally let the central system sensitize, g = 1.5, with the same gating in place: the drive becomes 1.5 × 8 = 12 before the gate acts, and P = 12 − 3 − 3 = 6. Sensitization has more than tripled the felt pain relative to the gated normal system, even though the injury and the gating are unchanged. This is the arithmetic behind three clinical facts at once: that counter-stimulation and descending control can suppress even severe pain, that the peripheral injury alone does not fix the felt intensity, and that a sensitized nervous system can turn a well-controlled pain back into a severe one without any change at the periphery. The demo above lets these three quantities be varied directly.
Current Directions
The most active front in contemporary pain science is the mechanistic reclassification of chronic pain, and in particular the consolidation of nociplastic pain as a third mechanism alongside nociceptive and neuropathic pain. Nociplastic pain names pain that arises from altered central nociception without a clear tissue lesion or nerve injury, and it provides a mechanistic home for conditions such as fibromyalgia that had long resisted a structural explanation (Fitzcharles et al., 2021). The category matters because it changes treatment: pain driven by central amplification responds poorly to peripheral fixes and better to interventions aimed at the central nervous system and at the cognitive and behavioral processes that sustain it. Alongside this, the ICD-11 classification of chronic pain has for the first time given chronic pain formal status as a diagnosis, which is reshaping how the burden of pain is counted and treated worldwide (Treede et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2021). A parallel thread uses neuroimaging to map how pain is represented across distributed brain systems and how the transition from acute to chronic pain reorganizes those representations, moving the locus of chronic pain from the periphery into the brain itself (Apkarian et al., 2005). Neuroimaging also continues to search for reliable brain signatures of pain and of its modulation by expectation, both to understand the mechanism and, more cautiously, as a potential objective marker for a fundamentally subjective experience (Tracey & Mantyh, 2007; Wager & Atlas, 2015).
Discussion
Pain is a common experience that turns out to require the whole apparatus of cognitive and physiological science to explain. Its peripheral cause is often plainly present, which makes it tempting to treat pain as a direct measure of injury. But the dissociation of nociception from pain in both directions, the power of gate-level and descending modulation, and the role of attention, expectation, catastrophizing, and central sensitization in chronicity all show that felt pain is constructed by the nervous system rather than transmitted from the tissue. Pain is the clearest case in all of perception of a percept that is actively built rather than passively received, which is why it has been so productive a testing ground for theories of how the brain constructs experience.
The practical corollary is that pain sits at the boundary of medicine and psychology and is managed badly when either side is ignored. Treating a tissue injury while ignoring a sensitized nervous system or a catastrophic belief can leave the pain in place; treating the psychology while ignoring a genuine peripheral driver is equally incomplete. That pain is defined by experience rather than by damage is not a philosophical nicety but the organizing principle of how it is measured, understood, and treated, and it is the reason a sensation is also, unavoidably, a subject of psychology.
Common Misconceptions
- Pain is a direct measure of tissue damage.
- It is not. Severe injury can go unfelt in an emergency, and severe pain can persist with no injury at all; the formal definition of pain was written specifically to break this equation (Raja et al., 2020).
- Nociception and pain are the same thing.
- Nociception is the peripheral signaling of tissue threat; pain is the experience the brain may construct from it. The two dissociate in both directions, which is why they are treated as distinct (Basbaum et al., 2009; Melzack, 1999).
- If pain is influenced by psychology, it is not real.
- Attention, expectation, and catastrophizing modulate pain through concrete neural mechanisms — the spinal gate and descending control — so a psychologically amplified pain is as real as any other, not imagined (Melzack & Wall, 1965; Bushnell et al., 2013).
Glossary
- Allodynia.
- Pain evoked by a stimulus that is not normally painful, such as light touch over a sensitized area.
- Aβ fiber.
- A large-diameter, fast, myelinated afferent carrying touch and pressure; its activity tends to close the spinal pain gate.
- C fiber.
- A thin, unmyelinated, slowly conducting afferent that carries much nociceptive input and tends to open the spinal pain gate.
- Central sensitization.
- An increase in the responsiveness of central pain neurons following sustained input, amplifying subsequent pain and sometimes producing pain from innocuous stimuli.
- Chronic pain.
- Pain that persists or recurs beyond normal healing, treated in ICD-11 as a condition in its own right rather than merely a symptom.
- Descending modulation.
- Control signals sent from the brain down to the spinal cord that can inhibit or facilitate the transmission of nociceptive signals.
- Fear-avoidance model.
- An account in which catastrophic interpretation of pain leads to fear, avoidance of activity, disuse, and a self-perpetuating cycle of disability.
- Gate control theory.
- The theory that a gating mechanism in the dorsal horn regulates nociceptive transmission, modulated by large-fiber input and by descending control.
- Hyperalgesia.
- An increased pain response to a stimulus that is normally painful, a hallmark of a sensitized pain system.
- McGill Pain Questionnaire.
- A multidimensional pain instrument that scores sensory, affective, and evaluative descriptors rather than a single intensity.
- Neuromatrix.
- Melzack's proposal that pain is generated by a widely distributed body-self network in the brain, modulated by but not delivered from peripheral input.
- Nociception.
- The neural encoding of stimuli that threaten tissue; the peripheral signaling that precedes, but is not identical to, pain.
- Nociceptor.
- A high-threshold sensory receptor that responds to potentially damaging mechanical, thermal, or chemical stimuli.
- Nociplastic pain.
- Pain arising from altered central nociception without clear tissue damage or a lesion of the somatosensory system, as in fibromyalgia.
- Pain catastrophizing.
- An exaggerated negative orientation toward pain — rumination, magnification, and helplessness — that predicts chronic pain and disability.
- Placebo analgesia.
- Pain relief produced by an inert treatment believed to be effective, acting through endogenous descending opioid control.
- Quantitative sensory testing.
- Standardized psychophysical measurement of sensory thresholds, such as the pressure-pain threshold, used to detect central sensitization.
- Visual analogue scale.
- A unidimensional pain measure on which a person marks intensity along a line from no pain to worst imaginable pain.
Key Researchers
A. Vania Apkarian (contemporary). Neuroscientist at Northwestern University who mapped the human brain mechanisms of pain perception and the transition from acute to chronic pain. Faculty Page - ORCID - Google Scholar - Wikipedia
Allan I. Basbaum (contemporary). Neuroscientist and Chair of Anatomy at the University of California, San Francisco whose review defined the cellular and molecular mechanisms of pain and the function of nociceptors. Faculty Page - ORCID - Google Scholar - Wikipedia
M. Catherine Bushnell (contemporary). Neuroscientist and former Scientific Director of intramural research at the NIH National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health, whose work established the cognitive and emotional modulation of pain. Faculty Page
Ronald Melzack (1929-2019). Psychologist at McGill University who, with Patrick Wall, proposed the gate control theory of pain, developed the McGill Pain Questionnaire, and later reframed pain as the output of a distributed body-self neuromatrix. Wikipedia - Wikidata - Google Scholar
G. Lorimer Moseley (contemporary). Clinical neuroscientist and physiotherapist at the University of South Australia, a leading contemporary figure in pain neuroscience education and the biopsychosocial reconceptualisation of chronic pain. Faculty Page - ORCID - Google Scholar - Wikidata
Michael J. L. Sullivan (contemporary). Professor of psychology at McGill University, developer of the Pain Catastrophizing Scale and a leading investigator of the cognitive determinants of pain-related disability. Faculty Page
Irene Tracey (contemporary). Neuroscientist and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford whose neuroimaging work defined the cerebral signature of pain perception and its modulation. Faculty Page - ORCID - Google Scholar - Wikipedia
Rolf-Detlef Treede (contemporary). Neurophysiologist at Heidelberg University who led the IASP taxonomy work reclassifying chronic pain for ICD-11. Faculty Page - ORCID - Wikidata
Tor D. Wager (contemporary). Neuroscientist at Dartmouth College whose work on the neuroscience of placebo effects connected expectation, learning, and pain modulation. Faculty Page - ORCID - Google Scholar - Wikipedia
Patrick David Wall (1925-2001). Neuroscientist at University College London who co-developed the gate control theory of pain with Melzack and founded the journal Pain. Wikipedia - Wikidata
Clifford J. Woolf (contemporary). Neurobiologist at Boston Children's Hospital and Harvard Medical School who described central sensitization and its implications for the diagnosis and treatment of pain. Faculty Page - ORCID - Wikipedia - Wikidata
Frequently Asked Questions
What is pain?
Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage. It is defined by the experience itself, not by the presence of injury (Raja et al., 2020).
What is the difference between pain and nociception?
Nociception is the neural signaling of tissue-threatening events by nociceptors; pain is the conscious experience the brain may construct from that signaling. The two can occur without each other, which is why they are treated as distinct (Basbaum et al., 2009).
What is gate control theory?
It is the theory that a gate in the spinal dorsal horn regulates how much nociceptive signal reaches the brain, opened by nociceptive fibers, closed by touch fibers, and biased by descending control from the brain (Melzack & Wall, 1965).
Why does rubbing a hurt or applying warmth help?
Touch and warmth recruit large-diameter fibers whose activity tends to close the spinal gate and reduce the transmission of nociceptive signals, as gate control theory predicts (Melzack & Wall, 1965).
How is pain measured?
Through report, because it is private: unidimensional scales such as the visual analogue and numeric rating scales capture intensity, and multidimensional tools such as the McGill Pain Questionnaire capture pain quality across sensory, affective, and evaluative dimensions (Raja et al., 2020).
Why does pain sometimes persist after an injury heals?
Sustained nociceptive input can produce central sensitization, in which central pain neurons become more responsive and keep generating pain even after the original cause has resolved (Woolf, 2011).
Can expectation and mood really change how much pain I feel?
Yes. Expectation drives the placebo response through endogenous descending opioid control, and attention and catastrophizing amplify or dampen pain through the same modulatory systems (Wager & Atlas, 2015; Bushnell et al., 2013).
How is chronic pain best managed?
With a biopsychosocial approach that pairs any needed treatment of the tissue with graded activity, education, and the targeting of catastrophic beliefs, because treating the periphery alone leaves the central amplifiers of pain untouched (Cohen et al., 2021).
References
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